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REAPING THE FRUITS OF A RIPE PROPERTY
TAKINGS CHALLENGE: ELIMINATING THE
RIPENESS PROBLEM IN FACIAL REGULATORY
TAKINGS CASES*
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, many American local governments and regula-
tory agencies face a variety of problems caused by sustained
urbanization and a corresponding decrease of land available
for development. These problems include shortages of afford-
able housing, decreasing amounts of land suitable for use as
open space, a dearth of areas available for waste disposal and
increasing air, noise, and water pollution. Furthermore, mu-
nicipalities must combat these problems in an era when the
federal government limits funds allotted to local government
programs' and when the public staunchly opposes any form
of increased taxation.
2
In an effort to control these modern urban challenges at
the lowest possible fiscal cost, municipalities and state gov-
ernmental agencies have turned to their constitutionally
granted police powers' to regulate the control and use of
real property. But, if these regulations effectively convert
* © 1990 by Kenneth A. Ehrlich
1. For example, federal grants to state and local governments, expressed in
1982 constant dollars and accounting for the GNP deflator, for fiscal 1986 was
$95 billion. The official estimate of the corresponding amount for 1988 was $84.1
billion. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL., SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF
FISCAL FEDERALISM 15 (1988). Thus, if the estimate for 1988 was accurate, federal
funding of state and local government programs dropped by 12% over the last
two years.
2. California's Proposition 13 (CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (West. Cum. Supp.
1980)) provides one example of citizen's disfavor with increased state taxation.
Passed by California voters in 1978, Prop. 13 created four new rules for taxation:
1) a 1% limit on property tax revenues; 2) limits to municipality assessments; 3)
voter approval required for state government-sponsored tax increases in the future;
4) similar voter approval for local government-sponsored future tax increases. CAL.
ASSEMBLY COMM'N. ON LOCAL GOV'T, TUIE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 13 (THE
JARVIS-GANN INITIATIVE) ON LOCAL GOV'T SERVICES AND FACILITIES 12 (1978).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. X reads: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
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otherwise private property into land for public use without
adequately compensating the landowner, then the
government's action constitutes a taking under the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution.4 When a mu-
nicipality or state governmental agency enacts a regulation
based on its police powers and causes a private landowner to
lose his property rights in favor of a public use without com-
pensation for the loss, a regulatory taking occurs.'
As local governments and state regulatory agencies 6 en-
act more land use regulations, courts spend increasing
amounts of time trying to discover where pragmatic local
action ends and regulatory takings begin.7 Regulatory takings
litigation is quite fact specific, and development of any stead-
fast rule of law in the area eludes many courts and legal
theorists.' In short, no clear test has emerged to determine
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V reads: "No person shall . . . be deprived of prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." The fifth amendment's takings clause, also known
as the just compensation clause, was made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
5. See generally Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J.
149 (1971).
6. The California Coastal Commission is an example of a state regulatory
agency which enacts land use regulations. Through zoning laws and a dedica-
tion/exaction process, the commission regulates development and construction in
the California Coastal Zone. For examples of suits challenging the commission's
land use regulations, see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 628, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 915, eh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985); Grupe
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985);
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 183
Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982); Liberty v. California Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d
491, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Eamniello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 208 Conn. 620, 546
A.2d 805 (1988) (mobile home park owner challenged City of Hartford's mobile
home rent control statute); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, modified,
830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 775 (1988); Hall v. City of
Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988)
(city's mobile home rent control statute challenged by landowner); Urbanizadora
Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983) (landowner challenged
city's open space regulation).
8. See generally Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth
Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS
L.J. 15 (1983); Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes
New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988); Berger &
Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of
Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatoiy Taking of Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L.
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when property regulation exceeds its scope and creates an
unconstitutional taking.
Regulatory takings law becomes even more complex
when a private landowner or representative group files suit
in the form of a facial challenge of an alleged regulatory
taking. In a property takings scenario, a facial challenge aris-
es when an individual or representative group contends that
the mere enactment of a regulation promulgated by a gov-
ernmental agency or municipality constitutes a taking without
just compensation.9 Instead of clarifying the situation, recent
United States Supreme Court decisions have only confused
an already befuddled area of the law."0 The nation's highest
court has constructed an unpredictable and ambiguous "ripe-
ness" standard which prevents the Court from analyzing the
merits of many facial challenges of alleged regulatory tak-
ings."' This unclear standard inhibits public agencies from
REV. 685 (1985); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1986); Falik & Slinko, The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court
Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View from California, 39 HASTINGS
LJ. 359 (1988); Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988); Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988); Peterson, Land Use Regulatoy "Takings" Revisited: The
New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1988); Sax, supra note 5; Van
Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by the Police Power" The Search for Inverse Condemnation
Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971); Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker, &
Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1974) [hereinafter
Manifesto].
9. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, modified, 830 F.2d
968 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 775 (1988); Lake Nacimiento Ranch
Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1987), revd, 841 F.2d
977 (9th Cir. 1988); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir.
1987).
For cases in which the merits are analyzed ("as applied" challenges), the Su-
preme Court applies an "ad hoc, multiple factor" balancing test. Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
10. See Pennell, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Keystone, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel, 452
U.S. at 264 (1981); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
11. See generally Bauman, The Supreme Court Becomes Serious About Takings Law:
The First Church, Keystone and hyving Cases, 10 ZON. & PLAN. L. REP. 145 (1987).
"Ripeness" is a preliminary standing requirement that must be filfilled
before the Supreme Court will analyze the merits of a case. See generally Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); American Motorcyclist Ass'n
v. Watt, 543 F. Supp. 789, 793-95 (1982). In the regulatory property takings arena,
the requirement is usually fulfilled only if an actual landowner proves that a
regulation has unconstitutionally taken his property and if this landowner has ex-
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serving the public welfare and also prevents private
landowners from developing property at a fair profit.'"
This comment reviews the state of American law con-
cerning facial challenges of regulatory takings, focusing espe-
cially on cases where the Supreme Court has found a lack of
ripeness, and proposes new criteria for determining the ripe-
ness of a facial regulatory takings challenge. Special attention
will be devoted to the latest in this line of cases, Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 3 which highlights the problem created by
the Court's untenable position.
Specifically, this comment asserts that the Court's arbi-
trary use of the ripeness doctrine prevents complete adjudica-
tion of important cases in this area of law. The proposed
criteria seek to create a more consistent method for deciding
these complex cases. Thus, landowners and regulatory bodies
would mutually benefit since their rights would be more
equitably defined.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Basic Analysis for Regulatory Takings
Before explaining the Court's underutilized regulatory
takings test, the circumstances surrounding a facial challenge
must be described. 4 A facial challenge arises when a land-
owner or representative group litigates the enactment of a
regulation promulgated by a governmental agency or munici-
pality. The property owner usually argues that the regulation
itself effectuates an actual taking because it interferes with
private economic interests." With increasing regularity, the
hausted his administrative remedies. See also Comment, Land Use Takings and the
Problem of Ripeness in the United States Supreme Court Cases, I B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 375
(1987) (comment reviews and summarizes the ripeness problem in facial and "as
applied" regulatory takings challenges up to 1987).
12. See generally Manifesto, supra note 8, at 214.
13. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
14. See Berger, supra note 8, at 745. In contrast with regulatory takings, a
physical taking involves government action which physically intrudes upon private
property or authorizes others to do so. For an example of the Court's analysis in
a physical takings case, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982).
15. In such a scenario, the landowner claims that the interference with his
property interests is so intrusive that the government action constitutes a taking.
See, e.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
868 [Vol. 30
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Supreme Court has refused to review the merits of suits
presenting facial challenges and has held such cases
nonjusticiable for lack of ripeness.' Consequently, many
governmental agencies are unsure of the validity of their par-
ticular land use regulations, such as rent control ordinanc-
es, 17 subsidence protection," and general land use
plans. 9
In the event that the Court reaches the merits of a facial
challenge, the standard test for determining whether the
regulation creates a taking was developed in Agins v. City of
Tiburon.2" In Agins, the landowners argued that a city zon-
ing ordinance, which dictated that appellants' land could only
be used for five, single family dwellings on lots with a mini-
mum size of one acre, constituted a taking without just com-
pensation." Affirming the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion, the United States Supreme Court held that, on its face,
the city's ordinance did not take appellants' property without
just compensation.
The Agins Court ruled that a regulatory taking would
have occurred only if the ordinance did not substantially
advance legitimate state interests or if the regulation denied
an owner economically viable use of his land.22 In Agins, the
ordinance substantially advanced the legitimate government
825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. County of
Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
16. E.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); MacDonald, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); William-
son County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
17. E.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983).
18. E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
19. E.g., MacDonald, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
20. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
21. Id. at 257.
22. Some theorists extend the Court's recent holding in First English, 482 U.S.
304 (1987) to overrule Agins. These theorists contend that, after First English, a
taking of any kind regardless of its length must be compensated. See, e.g., Berger,
supra note 8, at 744. Conversely, others assert that Fitrt English applies only to
cases of temporary takings. See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 11.
In contrast, if the Court reaches the merits of a regulatory takings case, the
analysis focuses on an ad hoc multi-factor balancing test. Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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interest of discouraging premature conversion of open space
land to more urban uses. 3 Further, the ordinance exempli-
fied a valid use of the city's police power since the regulation
protected Tiburon residents from the ill effects of urbaniza-
tion.24
Tiburon's ordinance also fulfilled the second aspect of
the test, allowing the owner to retain viable economic use of
the land, since appellants' best use of their land had not
been extinguished.25 The Court also noted that the city's
ordinance did not terminate the landowners' fundamental
right of ownership because the Agins' remained free to pur-
sue many profitable uses of their land by submitting a devel-
opment plan to the city,26 which had not yet been done.
Interestingly, the Court upheld Tiburon's ordinance but
refused to analyze the specific merits of the case. The deci-
sion stated that appellants' land use challenge was not ripe
since the Agins' had not yet applied to the city for any par-
ticular use of their land.27 Thus, the ripeness problem kept
the Court from addressing the merits of the case.
Since Agins, the Court has failed to reach the merits in
four other facial challenges that could have been decided by
applying the Agins analysis. 2' The ripeness problem looms
as the most obvious cause of the Agins test's downfall.29
23. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261-62.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 262-63.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (Court held appellants'
claim was not ripe because no actual person had been hurt by the government
action as no hearing officer had relied on the challenged provision to reduce a
rent below what it would have been as a result of other factors); MacDonald,
Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (landowner's claim was
not yet ripe because there was no final determination by the County Planning
Commission on how it will apply the zoning regulations at issue); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)
(appellants' claim was not ripe because the local planning commission had not yet
made a final determination of the requested use); San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (claim was unripe because the local
planning commission was still reviewing appellants' proposed use).
29. For a general review of the ripeness problem in regulatory takings cases,
see Comment, A New Approach to Regulatory Taking Analysis, I B.Y.U. J. PUB. L.
399 (1987). For an excellent discussion of the ripeness problem in the context of
California environmental and land use law, see 3 K. MANASTER & D. SELMI,
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL L.W AND LAND USE PRACTICE, ch. 68 (1989).
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The ripeness doctrine dictates that a regulatory takings
claim is not ready for a judgment on the merits either be-
cause the landowner has yet to exhaust available administra-
tive remedies 0 or has failed to present an actual person or
entity specifically affected by the challenged regulation."'
The Court's rationale for insisting on ripeness is based upon
article III of the United States Constitution, which permits
the judicial branch to render judgments only in actual con-
troversies.3 2
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angel-
es33 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission34 have con-
tributed to the proliferation of the ripeness doctrine. Since
the Supreme Court ruled that governmental actions in both
cases constituted unlawful takings, the Court has signaled
that it will no longer unconditionally uphold government
discretion in formulating land use policy. 5 Thus, counsel
representing regulatory bodies argue that the landowner's
claims are unripe since municipalities and state governmental
agencies do not want to test the scope and breadth of the
First English and Nollan decisions.3 6
Before First English and Nollan, the Court tended to
raise the ripeness argument unilaterally, which constitutes the
usual procedure concerning issues of justiciability. In such
situations, the Court would rule the case at hand unripe for
final judgment when administrative remedies remained avail-
able to the landowner.3 7 For example, on certain occasions,
the Court would evade the takings issue because of a lack of
ripeness, but still rule on the merits of other constitutional
30. E.g., MacDonald, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172
(1985); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
31. E.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also supra note 29.
33. 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (Court found that Los Angeles County owed com-
pensation to church for temporary taking of land used by the county for flood
control).
34. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Court rejected California Coastal Commission's
request for a lateral access easement from owners of beachfront property).
35. Prior to First English and Nollan, the last time the Supreme Court ruled
that a regulatory action effected a taking was in Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
36. See cases cited supra note 31.
37. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 30.
1990]
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challenges."8 On other occasions, even though the case pre-
sented multiple constitutional challenges, the Court would
nonetheless forego a ripeness analysis and address the merits
of the alleged takings challenge. 9
In any event, further analysis of facial challenges decided
both before and after First English and Nollan shows that the
Court's exercise of the ripeness doctrine in this area of law
has resulted in a vague and nebulous standard from which
little guidance can be gleaned. This conclusion will be sup-
ported by analyzing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Rec-
lamation Association4" (decided before First English and
Nollan), Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,41
and Pennell v. City of San Jose42 (the latter two cases were
decided after First English and Nollan).
1. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
The case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Association4" serves as a proper starting point for analyz-
ing the Supreme Court's use of the ripeness doctrine in fa-
cial challenges of regulatory takings. In Hodel, an association
of coal producers, four individual landowners, the Common-
wealth of Virginia, and the Town of Wise, Virginia brought a
pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977." The
legislation established a two-stage program, which includes an
interim phase and a permanent phase, whereby each state
would have the opportunity to formulate a plan to fulfill
federally-mandated standards for mining activities.
Under the Act, the Secretary of the Interior inherited
responsibility for enforcing the interim regulatory program
and creating performance standards under which individual
38. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (other constitu-
tional issues concerned due process and equal protection); Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (other constitutional is-
sues concerned due process, the Commerce Clause, and states' rights).
39. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987) (the other constitutional issue concerned the Contracts Clause).
40. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
41. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
42. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
43. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
44. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982). The Act was designed to protect both society
and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.
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states could develop their own programs. However, if a state
chooses, it may adopt a federally administered plan designed
for that particular state."5 In Hodel, the plaintiffs' suit specif-
ically challenged the sections of the Act which established the
interim regulatory program.46
After a thirteen day trial in Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association v. Andrus,4" the United States District
Court held that two of the Act's provisions violated the just
compensation clause of the fifth amendment.48 The Secre-
tary of the Interior, Hodel, appealed directly to the nation's
highest court.4"
In an opinion written by Justice Marshall,5" the Su-
preme Court found that enactment of the Act did not create
a taking without just compensation. But, the Hodel Court
failed to reach the merits of the case because neither the
parties nor the lower court identified any specific property
unconstitutionally taken by the operation of the statute.5
Justice Marshall ruled that "the constitutionality of statutes
ought not be decided except in an actual factual setting that
45. Id. Virginia chose to develop its own plan to combat the effects of strip
mining. The state's effort was partially approved and partially disapproved by the
Secretary of Interior. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 272, n.7.
46. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 272; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1987) [hereinafter Surface Mining Act]. Both the district court
and the Supreme Court ruled on multiple constitutional challenges. Only the
takings/just compensation clause analysis is relevant here.
47. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980).
48. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)(4) (1982). First, the district court held that section
575 of the Act constituted an uncompensated taking by requiring individual
landowners to restore "steep slope" surface mines to their approximate original
contour. The court reasoned that this requirement would be economically and
physically impossible. In the same line of argument, the court offered that, even if
the steep slopes were restored to their approximate original contour after mining,
the value of the land would be."practically nothing." Virginia Swface Mining, 483
F. Supp. at 437.
Second, the district court found that section 522, which prohibited mining
in certain locations, effected a taking since the Act prohibited a private landowner
from mining his own property. Id. at 441. The court based this finding on the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
since the statute deprived coal mine owners of any use of their land. Virginia Sur-
face Mining, 483 F. Supp. at 441.
49. lodel, 452 U.S. at 272. This case was appealed directly from the federal
district court in Virginia to the United States Supreme Court.
50. Id. (Marshall, J., was joined by Burger, C.J., Brennan, Stewart, White,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (Burger, C.J., Powell and Rehnquist, J.J.,
concurring).
51. Id. at 294.
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makes such a decision necessary."52 The Court further rea-
soned that without specific facts of an alleged taking, the ad
hoc, multiple factor balancing test5" used by the Court to
determine applied violations of the takings clause, could not
be administered.54
Since reaching a decision on the merits proved impossi-
ble, the Court applied the Agins test to determine if the
mere enactment of the Act effected a taking.55 Examining
whether the statute denied a landowner the economically
viable use of his land, the Court ruled that the Act did not
prevent beneficial use of coal-bearing lands. 6 Marshall fur-
ther ruled that the Act merely regulated the conditions un-
der which miners could conduct their operations and did not
purport to dictate alternative uses for coal-bearing lands.57
The final portion of the Court's takings discussion relat-
ed to the consequences of an unripe claim. The Court found
that the appellees (the Association) had not yet sought relief
through the administrative process explicitly created by the
Act.5" Since the Association ignored possible administrative
remedies, the Court concluded that appellees' claim had not
achieved sufficient ripeness to obtain final judicial resolution.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion59 largely echoed
Marshall's decision. Justice Powell reinforced the Court's
opinion with reasoning based on Justice Brennan's dissent in
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.6" In San
Diego Gas, Brennan asserted that any taking of private prop-
52. Id. at 294-95.
53. For applications of this test, see, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
54. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 294.
55. Id. at 296.
56. Id. Justice Marshall acknowledged that section 522 of the Act prohibited
mining on certain types of land, but also ruled that any challenge of this provi-
sion would be premature since: 1) none of appellees' land was affected by section
522; 2) section 522 does not prohibit non-mining uses of affected land; and 3) as
enacted, section 522 was made expressly subject to existing mining rights. Hodel,
452 U.S. at 296 n.37.
57. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 296.
58. Upon a proper request, section 515(c) (30 U.S.C. § 1265(e) (1976 &
Supp. II 1978)) allows for a variance from the approximate original contour re-
quirement of the Act. Further, section 522(c) (30 U.S.C. §1272(e) (1976 & Supp.
It 1978)) provides for a waiver from surface mining restrictions on specific types
of environmentally sensitive land. 30 U.S.C. §§ 515, 522 (1987 & Supp. 11 (1978)).
59. llodel, 452 U.S. at 305 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
874 [Vol. 30
1990] RIPENESS IN REGULA TORY TAKINGS
erty for public use deserves compensation." In the Hodel
facial challenge,62 which was based on due process grounds,
the appellees failed to allege that the Act appropriated any
specific land for public use. Thus, Powell cited Brennan's San
Diego Gas dissent to solidify the point that appellees may
litigate the actual takings issue in the future if a specific
landowner alleges that his property was taken by the enforce-
ment of the Act.6"
2. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
Like Hodel, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. v.
DeBenedictis" presented a facial challenge to an alleged reg-
ulatory taking. In Keystone, the appellants, an association
whose members owned, leased, or controlled large coal re-
serves in western Pennsylvania, challenged a Pennsylvania
statute 65 that sought to resolve problems of land subsidence
caused by underground coal mining. Specifically, section 4 of
the Subsidence Act prohibited coal mining that resulted in
subsidence damage to preexisting public buildings, dwellings,
and cemeteries. The legislature required fifty percent of the
mineable coal to remain underground in order to provide
surface support.66 Section 6 of the statute contained a provi-
sion requiring coal companies to repair subsidence damage
or pay damages to those who suffer such injury.67 The Asso-
ciation filed suit in federal district court claiming that en-
forcement of the statute constituted an uncompensated tak-
ing according to the fifth amendment.6"
The district court granted appellees' motion for summa-
ry judgment since the appellants had neither alleged nor
proved any specific injury caused by the statute's enact-
ment.69 The trial court also ruled that the Act served valid
61. Id. at 654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 266.
63. Id. at 306 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
65. Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52 §§ 1406.1-1478 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
66. Id. § 1406.4.
67. Id. § 1406.6.
68. Another part of the complaint alleged a Contracts Clause claim which will
not be discussed here.
69. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511, 513
(W.D. Penn. 1984).
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public safety purposes. Further, the court responded to
appellants' claim that the statute destroyed their interest in
the support estate 7  by ruling that the support estate con-
sisted of a bundle of rights, many of which remained unaf-
fected by the statute. 2
On appeal, the third circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, but the appellate court's analysis regarding the sup-
port estate differed somewhat from the rationale of the court
below. 7 The Association then appealed to the Supreme
Court.
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme
Court ruled that the enactment of the Subsidence Act did
not comprise a taking.74 Ignoring the increasingly popular
trend of finding appellants' facial regulatory takings claims
unripe,75 the Court decided Keystone on its merits.
First, Justice Stevens distinguished the present case from
Pennsylvania Coal by showing that the two factors considered
by the Court in Pennsylvania Coal, the state's interest in en-
acting the statute and the extent of the alleged taking, sup-
ported the present statute's constitutionality.76 The majority
then found that the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Subsi-
dence Act as a response to a perceived threat to public
70. Id. However, such valid public safety purposes were not found by the Su-
preme Court in a very similar suit decided over 60 years prior to Keystone. See
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, the
granddaddy of the modern takings case, Justice llohnes formulated his famous
edict; if a regulation goes too far, it will be considered a taking. Id. at 415.
71. Pennsylvania follows a unique method of classifying property interests. A
party can own any combination of three estates in land: the surface estate (surface
land only), the support estate (the land preventing the surface estate from subsid-
ing), and the mineral estate (the natural resources beneath the land). Id. at 518-19
(citing Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and the "Third
Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1951)).
72. Keystone, 581 F. Supp. at 518-19.
73. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985),
aftg, Keyston Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.
Penn. 1984). While upholding the statute as a reasonable government action, the
court of appeals considered the support estate as just one component of a larger
bundle of rights that included either the surface estate or mineral estate, both of
which were already owned by the coal companies. Keystone, 771 F.2d at 718-19.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that the Act did not destroy the landowners' bun-
dle of property rights.
74. Keystone, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
75. See supra notes 28-32.
76. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484-85.
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health and welfare." Further, contrary to the Kohler Act
litigated in Pennsylvania Coal, the present statute served to
benefit the entire public, not only private concerns.7 8
Second, the Keystone Court rigorously applied the Agins
test79 to the facts. Regarding the valid public purpose re-
quirement, the Court noted that the statute's explicit legisla-
tive intent 0 served a valid and rational public purpose. The
majority also found that the statute's broad language deters
mine operators from causing any subsidence damage, and
thus, relieved coal companies from paying Section 6 damag-
es.
8 1
After a summary of the Court's rulings in early takings
decisions,82 Justice Stevens rationalized the Court's reticence
in finding regulatory takings by stating that one of the
government's primary ways of preserving the public "weal""8
is limiting the uses individuals can make of their property.84
Although restrictions constitute a slight burden to landown-
ers, Justice Stevens noted, the general public benefits greatly
from such limitations.85 In short, the Court ruled that the
statute fulfilled a valid public purpose.
The decision also applied the second part of the Agins
test,86 namely, that government action creates a taking if it
denies a landowner of economically viable use of his land.87
The Court held that appellants had not shown any economic
deprivation substantial enough to prove a regulatory tak-
ing.8 Furthermore, the Act did not prevent appellants from
77. Id.
78. Id. Some theorists assert that Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Keystone
adopted its reasoning from Justice Brandeis' dissent iii Pennsylvania. Coal. For an
example of this viewpoint, see Callies, Takings Clause-Take Three, A.B.A. J. 54 (Nov.
1, 1987).
79. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-97. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V, X.
80. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485. The legislative intent of the Act includes:
conservation of surface land, protection of public safety, enhancement of affected
lands' value, preservation of surface water drainage and public water supplies, and
general improvement of use and enjoyment of affected lands. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
81. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.2.
82. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490.
83. Id. at 491.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text for discussion of Agins test.
87. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
88. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493.
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profitably engaging in their business, nor did it interfere with
their investment backed expectations.89 The majority rea-
soned that the Act allowed coal companies reasonable profit
from mining the area's natural resources because appellants
failed to specify a single mine which could no longer earn a
profit due to the enactment of the statute.9"
In comparing the value taken by the statute with the
remaining value in the property, the Keystone Court held that
the legislation allowed landowners to retain sufficient value
in their land so as not to effect a taking.9 Finally, the
Court concluded the economic use analysis by rejecting
appellants' contention that the Act completely destroyed the
value of their support estate. Here, the Supreme Court sup-
ported the Third Circuit's finding that the support estate
only has value because it "protects or enhances"9" the value
of the associated estates-the surface and/or mineral estates.
Thus, since appellants hold the right to utilize the mineral
estate, the statute's burden on the support estate does not
create a taking.9"
In his dissent,94 Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that
the Subsidence Act worked a taking of appellants' property
interests. Rehnquist rejected the majority's assertion that the
Pennsylvania Coal decision is "advisory."95 He believed the
differences between Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal "verge on
the trivial"96 since, like the Subsidence Act, the Kohler Act's
public purpose was to protect the public from subsidence
problems.
Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority's decision that
regulations designed to prevent public nuisances contain
enough of a public purpose, in and of themselves, to be con-
89. id. at 496. An example of an investment-backed expectation is the belief
held by a landowner that lie will earn profit as the result of developing or con-
veying his property.
90. Id.
91. The Court acknowledged that the Act forced appellants to leave approxi-
mately twenty-seven million tols of coal in the ground. Id. at 498. However, even
without the statute in effect, the majority noted that mining efforts can only
profitably extract seventy-five percent of the coal from any mine in the region. Id.
92. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501.
93. Id.
94. Id. (Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia, J.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 484.
96. Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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sidered valid." The Chief Justice stated that the legitimacy
of this "nuisance exception" presented a question of federal
law, subject to independent scrutiny by the Court.9" Al-
though the majority recognized Rehnquist's argument, the
Court held that, if for no other reason, the Act was valid
since it fell within the "public nuisance" exception.99
Moreover, Rehnquist stated that the statute effected a
taking based on the viable economic use prong of the Agins
test. He concluded that the twenty-seven million tons of coal
which appellants were forced to leave unmined represented a
significant amount of foregone revenue.'00 The Act caused
a loss comparable to that which would be suffered had the
government physically occupied the land.10'
Finally, Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's reasoning
that the value of the support estate constituted only a por-
tion of the total sum value of the three estates. Instead, the
Chief Justice asserted that the support estate had inherent
value separate from that of the other estates.0 2 Using the
belief that the support estate contained real independent
value, Rehnquist concluded that the Act effected a taking of
appellants property without just compensation.
3. Pennell v. City of San Jose
The Supreme Court's most recent decision in a case
presenting a facial challenge of an alleged regulatory taking
came in Pennell v. City of San Jose.' In Pennell, San Jose's
rent control ordinance withstood a takings, due process, and
equal protection challenge brought by a private apartment
building owner and a local association of apartment house
owners.
104
In 1979, San Jose's City Council enacted section 5703.28
of its city ordinance, the Rent Dispute Mediation and Arbi-
tration Ordinance."0 5 The stated legislative intent of the or-
97. Id. at 486.
98. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 486.
100. Id. at 515-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 516 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 519-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
103. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
104. This analysis shall focus only on the takings claim.
105. SAN JOSE, CAL., RENT DISPUTE MEDIATION AND ARB. ORDINANCE CODE §
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dinance consisted of the following:
to alleviate some of the more immediate needs created
by San Jose's housing situation. These needs include, but
are not limited to, the prevention of excessive and unrea-
sonable rent increases, the alleviation of undue hardships
upon individual tenants, and the assurance to landlords
of a fair and reasonable return on the value of their
property."°
The city reasoned that uncontrolled rent increases created
housing instability by forcing constant relocation of tenants,
resulting in a class of transient apartment dwellers. This dis-
placement of residents adversely affected the community in
general since some tenants were unable to find suitable hous-
ing at affordable rates.' °7
The ordinance sought to put the legislative intent into
action by allowing the landlord of a regulated unit to raise
the rent of a tenant in possession by a maximum of eight
percent per year. 8 With tenant consent, a landlord could
raise rents by more than eight percent. o However, without
tenant consent, a landlord wishing to raise rents by more
than eight percent must pursue an administrative process in
which a hearing officer would determine whether the addi-
tional rent increase was reasonable under the circum-
stances. 10
As stated, the ordinance granted certain increases above
17.23.440 (1979) (codified city ordinance no. 19,696 § 5703.28). This comment
shall follow the Supreme Court's lead in using the Ordinance's originally designat-
ed code section numbers.
106. Id. § 17.23.020 (codified city ordinance no. 19,606 § 55703.2).
107. See Brief of Appellee at 6, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988)
(No. 86-753).
108. SAN JOSE, CAL., RENT DISPUTE MEDIATION AND ARB. ORDINANCE CODE §
17.23.180 (1979) (codified city ordinance no. 19,696 § 5703.2). In comparison, Los
Angeles, California allows a 7 percent increase without review. Santa Monica,
California allows a 4 percent increase without review while New York City grants
landlord a 3 percent automatic increase.
109. The full amount of the noticed rent increase would go into effect for all
tenants, not including those tenants who file a timely petition for a hearing. See
id. § 17.23.210, .360 (codified city ordinance § 5703.12,.27).
110. Id. § 17.23.440 (codified city ordinance no. 19,696 § 5703.28). The hear-
ing officer must decide whether the additional increase is reasonable "taking into
consideration that the purpose of this ordinance is to permit landlords a fair and
reasonable return on the value of their property while protecting tenants from ar-
bitrary, capricious or unreasonable rent increases, and under the circumstances,
unjustified economic hardship." Id.
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eight percent even without tenant consent. First, section
5703.28(a) deemed reasonable an increase of five percent
plus the pass-through costs.' for increases for capital im-
provements and'required maintenance. Second, the ordi-
nance automatically allowed rent increases for increased costs
of landowner debt service.'
1 2
If a landlord sought rent increases greater than the five
percent plus pass-through costs or increased debt service
provisions, the ordinance dictated that the hearing officer
may consider seven factors to determine the reasonableness
of the proposed increase. Tenant hardship constituted the
final factor that the hearing officer could take into ac-
count."13
Richard Pennell, an apartment building owner in San
Jose," 4 filed suit in the Santa Clara County Superior Court
just weeks after the city council passed San Jose's rent con-
trol law. He claimed the tenant hardship factor," 5 coupled
111. Id. Pass through costs are assessments charged to tenants as soon as they
are incurred by the landlord.
112. SAN JOSE, CAL. RENT DISPUTE MEDIATION AND ARB. ORDINANCE CODE §
17.23.440(b) (1979) (codified city ordinance no. 19696 § 5703.28(b)).
"Debt service" is the interest and charges currently payable on a debt, in-
cluding principle payments. BL4CK'S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (5th ed. 1979).
113. SAN JOSE, CAL. RENT DISPUTE MEDIATION AND ARB. ORDINANCE CODE §§
17.23.440(c)(1)-17.23.440(c)(7) (1979) (codified City Ordinance no. 19,696 §§
5703.28(c)(I)-5703.28(c)(7)). The first six factors are objective: the landlord's fi-
nance costs, rental history of the unit, physical condition of the unit, increases or
reductions of housing services during the last 12 months before the effective date
of the proposed increase, other financial information voluntarily provided by the
landlord, and existing market value of rental rates for comparable units. The final
factor is subjective: tenant hardship. Id. § 17.23.450 (codified city ordinance §
5703.29) defines tenant hardship. It reads:
Any tenant whose household income and monthly housing expense
meet[] the criteria established by the Housing Assistance Payments
Program under Section 8, existing housing provisions of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974 (Public Law [sic] 93-383)
and the regulations pertaining thereto, shall be deemed to be suffer-
ing under financial and economic hardship which must be weighed in
the hearing officer's determination.
Id. § 17.23.450 (codified city ordinance § 5703.29).
In more understandable terms, a family of four with a yearly income below
approximately $31,000 per year qualifies tinder the hardship criterium.
114. At the time Pennell filed suit, lie owned an apartment building in San
Jose. While his claim was being appealed to the Supreme Court, he sold this
piece of property. Shortly before the Court rendered its decision, however, he
repurchased an apartment building.
115. SAN JOSE, CAL. RENT DISPUTE MEDIATION AND ARB. ORDINANCE CODE §
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with the section describing how a hearing officer balances
this subjective criterion with the six objective criteria, violated
the due process"' and equal protection" 7 clauses of the
United States Constitution."0 The trial court entered judg-
ment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiffs. The city ap-
pealed and the state court of appeals affirmed." 9
The City of San Jose appealed once again. 12' By a di-
vided vote, the California Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeal's decision and upheld the city's rent control ordi-
nance as a constitutional exercise of police power.' 2 '
Pennell then utilized the final possible avenue of judicial
review.
The United States Supreme Court granted Pennell's
subsequent appeal on a writ of certiorari. Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the Court's majority opinion upholding
the ordinance, 22 while Justice Scalia wrote the dissent.12 1
After ruling that appellants had standing to sue,124 the
17.23.440(c)(7) (1979) (codified City Ordinance no. 19,696 § 5703.28(c)(7)).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
117. 1I
118. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 154 Cal. App. 3d 365, 366, 201 Cal. Rptr.
728, 729 (1984). Pennell's original complaint did not allege that the ordinance
effected a regulatory taking. In June 1987, the complaint was amended following
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Court held that the commission's request for a lateral access
easement in exchange for a building permit constituted a taking).
119. PenneR, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 366, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (The appeals
court also validated an annual rental fee imposed by the city on each rental unit.
The validity of this fee was not litigated before the U.S. Supreme Court).
120. Id. at 365, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
121. Id. In contrast, the dissenters in the California Supreme Court found the
ordinance to comprise "a forced subsidy imposed on the landlord." Id. at 377,
201 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
122. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1986) (Renquist, C.J., Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, J.J.).
123. Id. at 15 (Scalia, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(Kennedy, J., did not participate in the decision).
124. The city argued that appellants lacked standing both as an individual and
as an association. For the current state of the law regarding individual standing,
see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (individual standing requires an actual
injury redressable by the Court). Concerning standing as a group or association,
see Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (an
association has standing on behalf of its members only when its members would
otherwise have standing to sue on their own).
Although the Court conceded that neither appellant had any tenant who
qualified under the hardship provision, Justice Rchnquist held that appellants
[Vol. 30
1990] RIPENESS IN REG ULA TORY TAKINGS
majority focused on Pennell's allegation that the tenant hard-
ship provision effected a taking of property without just com-
pensation. On this point, the appellants contended that the
consideration of tenant hardship would reduce the allowable
rental rate to an amount below the price established by the
six objective factors.125 Thus, the appellants further alleged
that the amount of the taking would equal the rate created
by consideration of the six objective factors less the allowable
rate established by weighing and balancing all seven factors.
The Court responded that appellants' takings claim was
premature due to the limited factual record before the
Court. The Chief Justice held that since a hearing officer had
never relied upon the tenant hardship factor to adjust a rent-
al rate, the exact consequences of such an action could not
be predicted.'26 Moreover, nothing in the ordinance re-
quired a hearing officer to reduce a rental rate on grounds
of tenant hardship.'27 Since the merits of alleged regulatory
takings demand analysis under an ad hoc, multi-factored
approach,'28 the Court stated that the present parties pro-
duced insufficient facts for the Court to rule on their takings
claim.' 29
The Pennell majority analogized the "unripe" status of
this litigation to that of Hodel's° where the landowner failed
to identify specific property allegedly taken by the govern-
mental action. Similarly, in Pennell, the Court found that it
could not rule upon a claim on the merits without a specific,
concrete allegation of a setting in which a rental rate was
lowered by the ordinance's provisions.1
3
'
The Supreme Court next considered appellants' due
owned property subject to the provisions of the ordinance and that appellants also
represented landlords who might have hardship tenants in their buildings. Pennel,
485 U.S. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. According to section 17.23.440 (codified City Ordinance § 5703.28) of
the Ordinance, the hearing officer may order that the proposed increase beyond
eight percent be disallowed based on consideration of all seven factors.
128. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978).
129. Pennel, 485 U.S. at 10.
130. Id. (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 294 (1981)).
131. PenneU, 485 U.S. at 10.
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process and equal protection claims.1 -2 With respect to the
due process contention, the majority stated that the mere
possibility of a hearing officer considering tenant hardship in
determining a fair rental rate did not invalidate the city's
ordinance on due process grounds. The Court found the
ordinance analogous to other forms of acceptable price con-
trol measures since San Jose's regulation was not "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the
legislature is free to adopt."' Lastly, Rehnquist concluded
that appellants' equal protection claim failed because the
ordinance was rationally related to the legislative purpose of
providing affordable housing.' s4
Justice Scalia's dissent agreed with the majority that the
ordinance survived constitutional scrutiny on due process and
equal protection grounds. However, in contrast to the
majority's decision, the Associate Justice found the rent con-
trol ordinance perfectly ripe for a facial takings analysis. In
fact, Justice Scalia believed that the ordinance effected a
taking of appellants' property. 3 5
First, Scalia asserted that the majority would not offer
their lack of ripeness argument if, for example, the city's
ordinance called for the hearing officer to consider the
tenant's race in fixing the rental amount. 36 According to
Scalia, appellants' takings claim was as ripe and mature as
their due process and equal protection claims, which were
decided by the majority.
The dissent also claimed that the majority confused phys-
ical takings with regulatory takings in their conclusion that
Pennell's claim was "premature."3 7 Scalia believed that the
132. Id. at 11. Since this comment focuses on property takings, the Court's
ratification of the San Jose ordinance on due process and equal protection
grounds will be afforded only cursory examination.
133. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-70 (1968) (quoting
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
134. For a superb overview of the differing degrees of the Supreme Court's
rationality review, see Calloway, Means-End Scrutiny in Amelican Constitutional Law,
21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 449 (1988).
135. PenneR, 485 U.S. at 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an alternative critique
of this dissent, see Kmiec, supra note 8, at 1652-54 (author analyzes whether the
hardship provision of the San Jose Ordinance sought to extract a benefit from the
landlords).
136. PenneR, 485 U.S. at 16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id. Scalia's exact language follows:
The Court confuses the issue by relying on cases, and portions of cas-
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San Jose ordinance effected a physical invasion of the
landlord's property,"'8 and, thus, deserved more than a fa-
cial analysis.' In an attempt to show that the majority
should have addressed Pennell's merits, Scalia discussed the
similarities between the instant case and both Keystone and
Hodel. 4° In Keystone, Scalia noted that the Court accepted a
facial challenge of an alleged regulatory taking and proceed-
ed to decide the case on the merits, without a hint of any
"unripeness" or "prematurity."' 4 ' With respect to Hodel,
Scalia contended that although the Pennell majority catego-
rized Hodel as a facial challenge, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion dealt with the "taking issue decided by the District
Court."1'4  The dissent believed that the Hodel trial court
adjudicated the case "as applied," not as a facial challenge.
Thus, Scalia felt the Court's Pennell decision made the same
mistake as the Court's Hodel holding since both majority
opinions limited their analyses to facial-and therefore un-
ripe-challenges.14
In a continued attempt to show that appellants' takings
claim was ripe, Scalia viewed San Jose's ordinance under the
Agins test as a government action which fails to advance legit-
imate state interests. 44 He argued that if the ordinance
were viewed as such, knowing the exact economic back-
ground of a particular tenant or the physical characteristics
of a particular apartment building would not change the
analysis. According to Scalia, the specific facts would be irrel-
evant in this case because a physical invasion of property
occurred.43 Nonetheless, Scalia still believed the ordinance
es, in which the Takings Clause challenge was not (as here) that the
law in all its applications took property without just compensation,
but was rather that the law's application in regulating the use of par-
ticular property so severely reduced the value of that property as to
constitute a taking.
I&.
138. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), any physical invasion caused by a governmental action constitutes a tak-
ing).
139. Id. See Berger, supra note 14 for a definition of a physical takings claim.
140. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 16.
141. Id. at 16-17.
142. Id. at 18 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297 (1981)).
143. It.
144. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text for the Agins test for facial
takings challenges.
145. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 19. Remember, Justice Scalia equates the San Jose
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would fail under the Agins test because of the tenant hard-
ship factor. 46
III. ANALYSIS
Careful examination of the United States Supreme Court
rulings in Agins,'47 Hodel,'48 Keystone, 4 ' and Pennell15
frames the major problem concerning facial regulatory tak-
ings challenges. The Court's arbitrary use of the ripeness
doctrine prevents complete adjudication of important cases
in this area of the law. Incomplete adjudication leaves affect-
ed property owners and lessees unsure of the extent of their
property rights-even after their claims have been heard by
the United States Supreme Court. Regulatory bodies find
themselves in a similarly tenuous position because the scope
of their police powers remain ill-defined. In short, both pub-
lic and private interests suffer from such a confused state of
the law.'
5 1
Basic tenets of real property law protect landowners
from unreasonable restraints on alienation, 152 use, and de-
velopment of their property. In short, use and development
of property is subject to valid public regulation. 5 The Su-
Ordinance with a physical invasion, such as found in Loretto v. Manhattan
Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
146. The dissent distinguished the San Jose ordinance from a constitutional
rent control statute on the basis of the hardship provision. Scalia stated that the
provision, by lowering rental revenue, forced landlords to suffer for problems
beyond their control the economic situation of the tenant. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 21.
Scalia then asserted that federal, state, or local programs should assist the under-
privileged instead of those landlords unfortunate enough to house poor tenants.
d. In sum, the dissent argued that the ordinance's tenant hardship provision ef-
fects a taking by forcing a public burden on a private party.
147. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Agins
case.
148. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hodel
case.
149. See supra notes 64-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Key-
stone case.
150. See supra notes 103-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Pennell case.
151. See generally Berger, supra note 8, at 781 n.241.
152. Alienability is the right of a landowner to control the terms, such as time
and price, of any conveyance of his land. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 112-21 (1985). Property owners remain sub-
ject to the reciprocal rights of their neighboring landowners, such as nuisance law
principles. Id.
153. However, California courts have held that property development is a privi-
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preme Court effectively thwarts these rights of property own-
ership through its inconsistent treatment of facial regulatory
takings challenges. Free alienability is hindered since no intel-
ligent property buyer would pay full value for land burdened
by pending, or inconclusive, litigation. 54 Similarly, an
owner's development rights suffer from a court's conclusion
that a regulatory takings claim is unripe because the extent
of allowable development remains unknown even after expen-
sive litigation.
By their very nature, facial regulatory takings claims are
particularly fact specific, which makes a uniform formula for
deciding every such case nearly impossible.'55 However, in-
creased judicial consistency would help both property owners
and regulatory bodies. Analysis of judicial inconsistencies and
ambiguous applications of established rules, as evident in
Agins, 5 6 Hodel, 57 Keystone, 15 and Pennell159 gives rise
to a proposal which offers specific criteria for courts to use
in determining the ripeness of a facial regulatory takings
challenge.
In Agins, as stated previously, 60 the Supreme Court
failed to reach the case's merits because the appellant had
not applied to the city for a specific use of his land.'6 '
lege, not a right. Trent-Meredith v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 328,
170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 691 (1981).
154. See Michelman, Propealy, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of :Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1216-17 (1967);
Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad ltocety: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1697, 1700 (1988).
155. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390, 397 (1926)
(Court held that regulatory takings cases, including constitutional challenges of
zoning ordinances, must be analyzed on a case by case basis-making the applica-
tion of a uniform formula impossible).
156. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Agins
case.
157. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hodel
case.
158. See supra notes 64-102 and accompan)ing text for a discussion of the Key-
stone case.
159. See supra notes 103-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Pennell case.
160. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
161. In the land use planning arena, the Court has also invoked other ripe-
ness requirements. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477
U.S. 340, 347 (1986) (property owner must apply not only for the maximum per-
mitted use under existing regulations, but also for less expansive permitted uses);
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
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Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to decide whether the
mere enactment of the land use regulation effected a taking.
In the following year, the Court failed to examine the merits
of Hodel because neither the property owners nor the trial
court identified any specific land appropriated for public
use.162 As in Agins, the landowner's claim that the regula-
tion itself constituted a taking was ruled ripe for adjudica-
tion. 16 Further, Hodel was decided by application of the
test originally formulated in Agins.'64
In Keystone, the facts presented a similar facial regulatory
takings challenge, but the Supreme Court failed to invoke
the ripeness doctrine in its decision.' Instead, the Court
limited its ruling to a thorough application of the Agins
test.1 66 Adding to the confusion, the Court's latest opinion
in this area of the law, Pennell, ruled appellants' claim un-
ripe.'67 The situation in Pennell resembled Agins and Hodel,
but the Court did not engage in a facial takings analysis, as
had been the case in the three earlier Supreme Court cas-
es.
16 8
Consequently, two related questions arise from the sum-
mary of facts presented above. First, in light of Agins, Hodel,
and Keystone (where the Court applied the appropriate facial
regulatory takings test), why did the Pennell court fail to ap-
ply the Agins test?" 9 Second, in light of the Court's use of
the ripeness doctrine in Agins and Hodel,7 ° why did the
Keystone court fail to invoke the same ripeness doctrine? Con-
sequently, the core of the facial regulatory takings problem
187-88 (1985) (landowner must apply for a v'ariance and must attain a final deter-
mination of uses permitted by the local agency).
162. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
294 (1981).
163. Id.
164. Id. See supy note 58.
165. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1989).
166. Id.
167. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 154 Cal. App. 3d 365, 201 Cal. Rptr. 728
(1988).
168. Id.
169. The Pennell Court's application of the ripeness doctrine should not have
affected whether the mere enactment of the ordinance effected a taking. In both
Hodel and Agins, the Court found the litigated claim unripe, but still ruled upon
whether the mere enactment of the questioned regulations constituted takings.
170. Penneil is analogous, but cannot stand as authority here because it was
decided after Keystone.
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lies in inconsistent application of the Agins/Hodel precedent
in the two latest cases, Keystone and Pennell.
Addressing the first question, the Pennell majority's fail-
ure to apply the Agins test in light of clear precedent to the
contrary seems incomprehensible. Explanation by the Court
in future decisions would be useful as the facts and proce-
dural context of Pennell dictate that the Court should have
applied the Agins facial challenge test.
The Supreme Court developed the Agins test to deter-
mine whether the enactment of a regulation constituted a
taking.'' In Agins and Hodel, the Court applied this test to
the facial challenge, and then invoked the ripeness doc-
trine. In these earlier cases, the lack of ripeness prevent-
ed an "as applied" analysis since the parties failed to allege
any specific property was taken. In Pennell, the Court used
similar reasoning in finding the challenge unripe, but failed
to follow precedent by not applying the Agins test.' Even
though Pennell presented the same type of challenge as the
earlier cases, including Keystone, the majority ruled that the
takings claim was "premature."
7 4
Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennell urged that appellants'
takings claim was in fact ripe for decision.'75 Specifically,
Scalia offered that the Agins test should rule and the applica-
tion of the test would reveal that the city's ordinance effect-
ed a taking since it does not advance a legitimate govern-
ment purpose. 76 For the purposes of this comment,
Scalia's conclusion that a taking occurred is less important
than the fact that he cut through the procedural obstacles
and utilized the proper tool for deciding facial challenges of
171. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1981). See also supra notes
20-27 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 11, 20-27, 50-58 and accompanying text.
173. Pennell, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 20-27, 136-44 and accompanying text.
176. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 18. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The author disagrees with
Justice Scalia on this point. Rent control, including San Jose's ordinance, advances
the legitimate state interest of striving to provide affordable housing for the less
advantaged classes of society. Further, the San Jose ordinance does not deny an
owner of economically viable use of his land since the ordinance ensures a fair
profit from rental housing. For a reinforcement of this point of view, see Motion
of Appellees to Dismiss or Affirm at 7-9, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988) (No. 86-753).
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regulatory takings, the Agins test.
Perhaps the Pennell majority passed on appellants' tak-
ings claim because the Court felt it stood on firmer ground
by upholding the city's ordinance on due process and equal
protection grounds.'77 But, in both Hodel and Keystone, the
Court ruled on the alleged takings claim in concert with
other constitutional challenges.' Nevertheless, the question
of why the Pennell court failed to rely upon the Agins test
cannot be properly answered without further assistance from
the Supreme Court itself.
A precise answer to the second question, concerning the
lack of a ripeness analysis in Keystone, proves equally difficult.
The answer could lie in Keystone's similarity to the earlier
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 79 Although the is-
sue in the latter case concerned an "as applied" challenge
and was therefore decided on the merits, the facts of Pennsyl-
vania Coal otherwise mirrored those presented sixty-six years
later in Keystone.'
Even though Keystone involved a facial challenge, 18 the
Court may have chosen to forego application of the ripeness
doctrine because both Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal litigated
the validity of Pennsylvania statutes that sought to prevent
land subsidence caused by mining operations. s2 The cases
share another factual similarity as well, since both appellants
contended that a state statute unconstitutionally took proper-
ty without just compensation. Thus, the Keystone court may
have thought the interests of those involved would be more
equitably served by rendering a judgment, even if opposite to
that of analogous precedent,183 than by invoking the ripe-
177. See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 11-15.
178. In Hodel (Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1981)), the mining association also argued due process and states' rights
claims. In Keystone (Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DcBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987)), the appellants also claimed that the statute violated the contracts clause of
the United States Constitution.
179. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
180. A few differences exist between the two cases. For example, in Pennsylva-
nia Coal, the Act was passed to protect private interests who had released their
right to subsidence protection. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 52, § 661 (Purdon
1966). In contrast, the statute litigated in Keystone (480 U.S. 470 (1987)) was en-
acted to protect the public from land subsidence.
181. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
182. See Bituminous Mine Substance and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 52, §§ 1406.1-1478 (Purdon Supp. 1986); ld. § 1406.4.
183. The United States Supreme Court came to opposite conclusions in Penn-
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ness doctrine and not addressing the merits of the claim.
Alternative reasons may exist for the Court's decision to
forego a ripeness analysis in Keystone even though the doc-
trine was applied in Agins and Hodel. However, Keystone devi-
ates from established precedent'8 4 set by Agins and Hodel,
since all three suits comprised pre-enforcement challenges of
alleged property takings. Coupled with the Pennell Court's
failure to apply the established test for facial challenges, the
inconsistency in the Keystone decision reveals that the present
state of the law is unknown in the field of facial regulatory
takings challenges.
Although the Supreme Court's overall discretion in ap-
plying the ripeness doctrine, and other rules concerning
standing, should remain intact,'8' an obvious need exists
for increased consistency and clarity in facial regulatory tak-
ings challenges. However, the Court's discretion should not
be abused to the extent that random judicial fiat determines
whether the Supreme Court shall decide on the merits a
good faith claim grounded in the takings clause of the Unit-
ed States Constitution's fifth amendment. Therefore, the
Court's discretion in these matters should be guided by spe-
cific criteria. These criteria would aid the Court in determin-
ing the ripeness of a facial challenge of a regulatory taking
and, hopefully, allow for more uniform application of the
AginS test. 86
sylvania Coal and Keystone. The Court ruled that the legislation effected a taking in
Pennsylvania Coal. In contrast, the Court held that no taking arose in Keystone.
184. See supra note 161 for additional ripeness requirements.
185. For the current state of the law regarding the concept of standing, see
supra note 124. See also Berger, supra note 8, at 788 n.273.
186. For examples of "as applied" (non-facial) regulatory takings challenges, see
supra note 161.
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IV. PROPOSAL
The preceding analysis shows that the Supreme Court
has applied the ripeness doctrine to facial regulatory takings
cases in a seemingly arbitrary, inconsistent manner. 8 The
Court strictly applied the ripeness doctrine in Agins,'
88
Hodel,'89 and Pennell,' but made no mention of the con-
cept in Keystone.'9 ' In an effort to create a more uniform
process of decision making in facial regulatory takings chal-
lenges, the Court should weigh and balance the following
three criteria to determine the suit's ripeness: 92 the prop-
erty owner's meaningful opportunity for, or the futility of,
seeking administrative relief;'," future, emergent circum-
stances affected by deciding the particular regulation's validi-
187. In pursuit of a more uniform application of the ripeness doctrine in the
entire regulatory takings area, the proposed criteria could also be used in "as ap-
plied" regulatory takings challenges.
188. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Agins
case.
189. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hodel
case.
190. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). However, the ripeness doc-
trine was applied at different points of the Court's analysis. In Agins and Hodel,
the doctrine was applied after the Court examined whether the mere enactment
of the regulation effected a taking. In Pennell, the doctrine was invoked at a point
which prevented the Court from analyzing the facial validity of tile ordinance.
191. See supra notes 64-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Key-
stone case.
192. Individual states are under no affirmative duty to abide by federal ripe-
ness requirements. MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 29, ch. 68. However, where
applicable, federal courts must follow the United States Supreme Court's justiciabil-
ity rules. Id.
The three criteria should be weighed and balanced together. But, since
cases may arise where all three cannot apply (such as where no administrative
remedy is available), a court may give more weight to one or two separate criteri-
on over the other(s). For example, if the analysis of one criterion dictates un-
equivocally that the claim is ripe, then this one factor alone may be strong
enough for the court to rule that the claim is ripe and then apply the appropri-
ate takings test.
193. Exhaustion of remedies is already a generally applied principle of adminis-
trative law. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTR.TIVE L.Xw TEXT § 20.01, at 382-83 (1972). See
also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
Regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies in relation to California
facial regulatory takings cases, see K. MANASTER & D. SELMI, supra note 29, §
68.32. This treatise also contains a separate discussion of the administrative futility
doctrine in California. K. MANASTER & D. SELMI, supra note 29, § 68.30(4).
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ty; and consideration of whether the case's record can be (or
has been) properly supplemented for the Court to rule on
the validity of the regulation. Each of the three criteria is
further explained below.
First, in deciding the ripeness doctrine's applicability to a
specific facial regulatory takings challenge, the Court should
consider the landowner's opportunity for, and value of, seek-
ing administrative relief. Previously, the Court included the
landowner's opportunity for administrative remedies as part
of its ripeness analysis.'94 However, this criterion adds con-
sideration of the futility of the same administrative process
to the ripeness equation. After balancing all three of the
criteria, if the Court, either retrospectively or prospectively,
finds that pursuit of administrative remedies for the particu-
lar claimant would be futile, then the Court should rule the
claim sufficiently ripe for the Agins test to apply.
Don and Bonnie Agins, the appellants in Agins v. City of
Tiburon,"' exemplify the relevance of this first criterion. In
the years since the Supreme Court decided their suit against
the city of Tiburon, the Agins' have learned firsthand of the
futility of the city's administrative process. Following the
Court's decision that the claim was not ripe since the appel-
lants had yet to apply to build on the property, 96 the
Agins' requested permission from the city to subdivide the
parcel into five buildable lots.
Together, the city council and the local planning com-
mission considered the Agins' proposal for over five
years.'97 After a series of hearings and conferences, the city
194. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The intent is this
criterion is not to undermine effective local administrative processes. In the vast
majority of instances, it is likely that local administrative bodies could apply local
regulations to landowners more efficiently than foreign courts. However, problems
arise when local administrative processes fail to pursue legitimate government
purposes. See infm notes 179-85 and accompanying text for a specific instance of a
futile local administrative process (the city of Tiburon's lengthy delay in granting
uses for the Agins' parcel). Therefore, this criterion would enable a court of law
to intervene and redress a seemingly futile situation.
195. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
196. Id. at 262-63.
197. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987) (No. 85-1199) [hereinafter Amicus Brien.
The author would like to thank Robin Rivett and Tim Bittle of the Pacific
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attached a variety of conditions to the proposal, such as the
dedication of open space and a hiking trail, an environmen-
tal impact report, a traffic study, in lieu fees,' and utility
connection fees.'99 After enduring five years of administra-
tive delays and spending approximately $560,0002 to satis-
fy the city's conditions, the Agins' were finally granted the
right to subdivide their property into three lots (not five lots
as originally allowed) in October, 1985.
However, just two days before the final subdivision map
was recorded, the city council adopted a city-wide building
moratorium, which temporarily banned construction in
Tiburon. The Agins' administrative delay continued as city
voters later extended the moratorium indefinitely."' In Au-
gust, 1988, after a final round of litigation,02 the Agins'
reached a settlement with the City of Tiburon. 3
As made obvious by the Agins' experience, the Court
should consider whether the available administrative remedies
will be effective. The Court should weigh this factor on a
case by case basis, in light of the specific administrative body
responsible for the claimants' land. If subjecting the claimant
to the administrative process would prove futile, when bal-
anced against the other two criteria, this factor would sup-
port a finding of ripeness and subsequent application of the
Agins test.
Second, the Court should consider future circumstances
affected by ruling on the present claim's validity. Although
seemingly difficult, this criterion examines whether a facial
regulatory takings challenge requires an actual party in order
Legal Foundation for their help in gathering information regarding the plight of
the Agins' in their struggle to develop their land.
198. In lieu fees are payments made by a landowner to a regulatory body in
consideration for the waiver of certain conditions originally attached by the regula-
tory body to the landowner's proposed development.
199. Amicus Brief, supr note 197, at 5.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 6.
202. Telephone interview with Tim Bittle, Counsel for Don and Bonnie Agins
(Jan. 9, 1989). In November, 1985, the Agins', and other similarly situated land-
owners, filed suit claiming that the enactment of the indefinite building morato-
rium violated provisions of California's Government Code. The parties jointly
sought a form of alternative dispute resolution and a private rent-a-judge decided
the suit in the Agins' favor.
203. Telephone interview with Ken Cohen, the Agins' local counsel (Jan. 9,
1989).
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to adjudicate the claim successfully. If the Court finds an
actual individual unnecessary to address the validity of the
regulation, then this criterion should be considered with the
other two to determine whether the ripeness doctrine should
apply.20
4
Sometimes, such as when a regulation dictates that an
appointed individual or regulatory body should apply
statutorily-mandated factors at their discretion, an actual indi-
vidual adversely affected by the regulation is not essential.
Since application of the mandated factors would be discre-
tionary, these factors may never be applied to any individual.
The facts of Pennell provide such an example.
In Pennell, as discussed earlier,20 5 the city's rent control
ordinance specified seven factors, any of which could be
used by the hearing officer in ruling on the landlord's pro-
posed rent increase. Thus, a hearing officer could never ap-
ply the litigated factor 2 6 to an actual request for increased
rental rates because application was completely discretionary.
In short, if a party argues that the enactment of a regulation
with discretionary components constitutes a taking, then an
actual example of how such a taking occurs should not be
needed to adjudicate the matter properly. The "legitimate
state interest" strand 0 7 of the Agins test can still apply.
Thus, when determining the ripeness of a facial regulatory
takings challenge, the Court should determine whether an
actual party is needed to rule on the claim's validity.
Third, the Court should consider whether additional
facts are available to supplement the record before the Su-
preme Court. If such relevant facts are available, then the
parties should augment the record so that these additional
facts can be balanced with the other two criteria to deter-
mine the cases's ripeness.
The United States Constitution does not allow the Su-
204. This criterion should not violate the United States Constitution's (U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2) proscription against advisory opinions because many enacted
statutes may never be applied to actual individuals. Such discretionary statutes
should still withstand constitutional scrutiny. For an example of the Supreme
Court upholding such a discretionary regulation, see Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1 (1988).
205. See supra notes 114-20.
206. See supra notes 114-20. In Pennell, the litigated factor was tenant hardship.
207. See supra notes 22-24 for an explanation of this part of the Agins test.
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preme Court to issue advisory opinions.20 8 Therefore, the
Court must limit their cases to only those with an adequate
factual basis. Especially with facial challenges of regulatory
takings, the Court should have access to a complete factual
record before deciding a case.
In Pennell, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
declared, "[w]e strongly suggest that in future cases parties
litigating in this Court under circumstances similar to those
here take pains to supplement the record in any manner
necessary to enable us to address with as much precision as
possible any question of standing that may be raised."" 9
Thus, the Court should examine the ability of the parties to
supplement the record in tandem with the other two criteria
when determining the ripeness of a facial regulatory takings
claim.
The proposed criteria would not undermine the Su-
preme Court's discretion in ruling upon a suit's ripeness.
The ripeness criteria would act as guidelines for the Court in
exercising their inherent discretion."' If the Court follows
these guidelines, both regulatory bodies and property owners,
including counsel for these parties, would greatly benefit.
Regulatory bodies would gain knowledge regarding what
types of regulations, statutes, or ordinances will withstand
facial constitutional scrutiny. Similarly, property owners
would know the prerequisite standing requirements for bring-
ing a facial, challenge of an alleged regulatory taking. Both
208. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
209. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
210. Some may argue that since the ripeness criteria are only guidelines, and
not strict requirements, the proposed factors would actually grant tile Supreme
Court additional discretion in facial regulatory takings challenges. However, this
argument ignores tie premise of the proposal. In addition to fuarthering the goal
of more clear and consistent judicial decision-making, the ripeness criteria are an
attempt to foster increased judicial recognition of three important factors underly-
ing facial regulatory takings challenges-administrative futility, the possibility that
certain legislative provisions will never be applied, and the possibility of supple-
menting the judicial record. Hopefully, increased recognition of these underlying
factors would strike the illusive balance between random judicial fiat and dogmatic
reliance on ineffective rules of law.
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public and private interests would also save millions of dol-
lars they would otherwise spend challenging and defending
the validity of land regulations. Finally, the criteria would aid
real property attorneys in gathering necessary facts and creat-
ing the essential legal arguments for this type of claim.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether owned by a public entity, private individual, or
multinational land development corporation, American real
estate is too valuable to be governed by inconsistent and
vague rules of law. Property owners and government regula-
tory agencies deserve to know where valid land use regula-
tion ends and a property taking begins. Toward this ultimate
goal, these same entities deserve to know when and how
litigation in which they are involved becomes ripe for proper
adjudication.
Today, the fine line between a valid regulation and an
unconstitutional property taking remains ambiguous. 1' As
shown by Agins, Hodel, Keystone, and Pennell, the line between
a ripe and unripe facial regulatory takings challenge is equal-
ly ambiguous. With an eye toward developing a concise defi-
nition of where a valid regulation ends and a property taking
begins, the proposed ripeness criteria seek to add clarity and
consistency to an otherwise incomprehensible state of the
law. While property owners seek increasingly novel ways of
extracting profit from their land holdings and regulatory
bodies strive to protect both society and the environment,
211. For the latest United States Supreme Court cases seeking to define this
line, see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County 6f Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987). For the latest action by a Supreme Court Justice on the future of the law
in this area, see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
These recent cases have also earned a response from the executive branch.
On March 15, 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,630, "Gov-
ernmental Actions and Interference With Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights" (Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988)). The Orler establishes
criteria for administrative agencies to follow when granting specific use permits to
private landowners and when exerting federal eminent domain power. Executive
Order No. 12,630 also seeks to prevent a financial drain on federal funds due to
agency action concerning private property. Jackson & Albaugh, A Critique of the
Takings Executive Order in the Context of Environmental Regulation, 18 ENV'T. L. REP.
10463 (1988). See also Marzulla, The New "Takings" Executive Order and Envivnmen-
tal Regulation: Collision or Cooperation?, 18 ENV'T. L. REP. 10254 (1988).
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the proposed ripeness criteria should enable the law to pro-
vide a solid base upon which these competing interests must
coexist.
Kenneth A. Ehrlich
